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Abstract
We prove that if a stochastic (social choice) rule has an obviously strategy-proof
(OSP) implementation (Li, 2016), then it has such an implementation through a
randomized round table mechanism, where the administrator randomly selects a
game form in which the agents take turns making public announcements about
their private information. When restricted to deterministic rules, our result im-
proves upon other recent revelation principles by relaxing all recall requirements
and by allowing all game trees compatible with normal forms (Alo´s-Ferrer and
Ritzberger, 2016); we also establish robustness to player randomization using novel
solution concepts involving mixed strategies and behavioral strategies. We use
our result to provide a justification for ordinal mechanisms in the spirit of Carroll
(2017), and we provide a simple characterization of the deterministic rules with
OSP-implementations using deterministic round table mechanisms and ordinary
strategy-proofness.
Keywords: obvious strategy-proofness, revelation principle, randomized round
table mechanism
1 Introduction
1.1 Overview
A group of agents who wish to condition a decision on their collective information accord-
ing to some rule may face a problem familiar in politics and economics: this collective
information is known to nobody in its entirety. Such a situation can merit the design
of an institution called a game form (or mechanism), which specifies an unambiguous
procedure by which the agents make choices to ultimately determine their fate. The
plausibility of such an institution succeeding is precisely the plausibility of the agents
using what they individually know to make choices that lead to, or implement, the de-
sired outcome, and this is typically articulated using a solution concept: a list of plausible
equilibria for every game. In response to experimental evidence challenging the universal
*Department of Economics, Maastricht University, Maastricht, the Netherlands. Email:
a.mackenzie@maastrichtuniversity.nl. I thank Gabriel Carroll, Yannai Gonczarowski, Herve´ Moulin,
Marek Pycia, Yangwei Song, and William Thomson for their comments. I am particularly grateful to
Shengwu Li for his thorough feedback and suggestions.
1
plausibility of dominant strategy equilibrium, the more demanding notion of obviously
dominant strategy equilibrium was recently proposed (Li, 2016), and the objective of this
article is to establish a revelation principle promising that any investigation of imple-
mentation with this new solution concept—what is called obviously strategy-proof (OSP)
implementation—can be safely restricted to a class of canonical game forms.
To understand the new demands of OSP-implementation, recall that one strategy
dominates another if it yields an outcome that is at least as desirable no matter what
happens. If there are many things that might happen, then, calculating that one strategy
dominates another is a rather taxing exercise. On the other hand, if one compares the two
strategies only when confronted with the choice of continuing with one or the other, and
at this point every outcome the first strategy might yield is at least as desirable as every
outcome the second might, then a thorough case-by-case calculation is unnecessary; the
first strategy obviously dominates the second. In this way, a strategy might be dominant
but not obviously so, and an equilibrium might consist of strategies that are dominant
but not obviously so.
Due to these new demands, game forms that were adequate for dominant strategy
implementation may fall short for OSP-implementation. Indeed, though the classic reve-
lation principle promises that any investigation of implementation in dominant strategies
can be safely restricted to direct mechanisms, where agents simultaneously report what
they know (Gibbard, 1973; Myerson, 1981), this is not true for OSP-implementation (Li,
2016). This point is illustrated by a variety of examples:
• for the allocation of one object and money, the second-price auction (Vickrey, 1961)
can be OSP-implemented (through an ascending clock auction), but not through
its associated direct mechanism (Li, 2016);
• for object allocation, any dual dictatorship rule1 can be OSP-implemented, but not
through its associated direct mechanism (Troyan, 2016);
• for random object allocation, randomized serial dictatorship can be “random OSP-
implemented,” but not through its associated direct mechanism (Pycia and Troyan,
2017);
• for the marriage problem, if preferences are “very homogeneous” for one side of the
market, then deferred acceptance (Gale and Shapley, 1962) can be OSP-implemented,
but not through its associated direct mechanism (Ashlagi and Gonczarowski, 2016);
and
• for social choice among ordered alternatives when preferences are single-peaked, any
dictarship with safeguards against extremism rule has an OSP-implementation, but
not through its associated direct mechanism (Bade and Gonczarowski, 2017; see also
Arribillaga, Masso´, and Neme, 2017).
Thus an analyst may like to know: is there some canonical class of game forms to which
a mechanism designer interested in OSP-implementation can safely restrict attention?
The purpose of this paper is to provide the strongest possible reassurance that this is
indeed the case, and to do so at a level of generality that covers the above applications
and many others.
1In a dual dictatorship rule, property rights are defined using a priority structure in a narrow class,
then Gale’s top trading cycles (described in Shapley and Scarf, 1974) is applied.
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The usefulness of such a revelation principle to the analysis of OSP-implementation
has in fact already been demonstrated. Independently of this paper, other recent work
has developed several versions of the following result and applied it in various settings:
if a deterministic rule can be OSP-implemented in pure strategies through a game form
satisfying some notion of recall, then it can be OSP-implemented in pure strategies
through a game form where agents take turns publicly announcing some of what they do
and do not know (Ashlagi and Gonczarowski, 2016; Pycia and Troyan, 2017; Bade and
Gonczarowski, 2017). In such a game form, an agent may not reveal everything he knows
at once, but as the agents confide in one another turn after turn, group trust is slowly
built in the sense that it eventually becomes apparent to all that it is safe to share the
truth. We refer to these game forms as round table mechanisms. See Section 1.3 for a
detailed comparison of our Proposition 2 to these other results.
Unfortunately, the above result is of limited use in the analysis of stochastic rules,
where a group would like to condition a probabilistic distribution of outcomes on their
collective information—for two reasons. First, the result only applies if the analyst re-
stricts attention to game forms where the players’ choices determine lotteries, and this
modeling approach faces a conceptual issue: if a terminal history assigned a lottery is
appropriately expanded into a history where the administrator randomly selects a termi-
nal history assigned a sure outcome, then a strategy that was obviously dominant may
no longer be. In other words, when a player contemplates what may happen when com-
paring strategies, he must consider randomization during play in a different manner from
randomization after play. Second, even if this conceptual issue is set aside, the mod-
eling approach requires all desired randomization to occur after play concludes instead
of over the course of play, which is a serious restriction for OSP-implementation. This
restriction is sharply illustrated with random serial dictatorship for the assignment of
indivisible objects to agents: while this rule has a “random OSP-implementation” where
the administrator randomizes at the start of play (Pycia and Troyan, 2017), it has no
OSP-implementation where the desired lotteries are determined by play (Theorem 2).
When investigating the OSP-implementation of stochastic rules, then, it is not safe to
restrict attention to round table mechanisms.
Fortunately, there is in fact a canonical class to which the analyst can safely restrict
attention for a formal notion of random OSP-implementation. In particular, our main
result states that for the analysis of stochastic rules, it is safe to restrict attention to
what we call randomized round table mechanisms, where the administrator acts once at
the start of play, randomly selecting a round table mechanism (Theorem 1). Familiar
examples of randomization at the start of a mechanism include the selection of a priority
order for random serial dictatorship and the selection of school priorities for students in
school choice. We emphasize that this revelation principle still requires the analyst to
consider the entire class of randomized round table mechanisms, in contrast to the classic
revelation principle for dominant strategy implementation, which allows the analyst to
the focus on a single canonical game form; this point is also raised by Arribillaga, Masso´,
and Neme (2017).
The precise statement of our main result is particularly general; when applied to de-
terministic rules, it improves on the other revelation principles in several ways. Most
notably, it has thus far not been known whether or not there are any rules that can only
be OSP-implemented through game forms that violate recall requirements. In situations
where players are individuals, such a game form might require someone to forget a pre-
vious action—or even to be unsure if he has already been called to play—and it perhaps
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goes without saying that the institutionalized altering of the contents of an individual’s
memory raises serious ethical (and practical!) concerns. On the other hand, in situations
where players are groups (such as organizations, firms, or households), such a rule could
be OSP-implemented if various representatives of a group are sometimes called to play
without knowledge of whether or not other representatives have been called and how
they have played—say, if the mechanism’s administrator decides who to interview and
what to ask based on previous interview responses (Isbell, 1957). Because we drop all
information set restrictions, our result implies that there are no such rules: there is no
need for technology that alters memories, and it is always sufficient to summon a single
representative from each group to play.2
1.2 Further results
After establishing our revelation principle and the necessity of this generalization, we
provide three further results related to OSP-implementation and canonical classes of
mechanisms.
First, we generalize the model to accommodate randomization by the players in ad-
dition to the administrator. At first glance, it is ambiguous whether this would expand
or shrink the collection of rules which can be OSP-implemented. On the one hand,
perhaps more rules can be implemented simply because there are additional strategies
that players have access to. On the other hand, perhaps fewer rules can be implemented:
when an agent contemplates what might happen when comparing strategies, he has more
to worry about when he and his opponents might randomize, reducing occurrences of
obvious dominance. This latter point is especially a concern in game forms that violate
recall assumptions: under the interpretation that representatives of a group are called to
play, behavioral strategies allow a group to realize choices that, without randomization,
would require coordination between representatives that is forbidden by the structure of
the game form.
Unfortunately, our proof approach is not able to accommodate probabilistic notions
of OSP-implementation, even if it is almost-sure (Example 1). That said, using a sure
notion of OSP-implementation, we establish that if a deterministic rule has an OSP-
implementation in any kind of strategies (pure, mixed, or behavioral), then it has an
OSP-implementation in pure strategies through a round table mechanism—even if a
group entertains the possibility that it, or its opponents, may later discover a way to
coordinate choices in a manner that is forbidden by the laws of the mechanism (The-
orem 3). Altogether, while player randomization does not help, the contemplation of
player randomization does not hurt; in this way our reassurance that it is safe to restrict
attention to round table mechanisms is particularly robust.
We then use our revelation principle to prove a result in the spirit of Carroll (2017)
for settings where there is a finite collection of outcomes, and where agents have von
Neumann-Morgenstern types compatible with strict rankings of outcomes. In particular,
we prove that if a stochastic rule has an OSP-implementation, then it is ordinal, and
moreover has a round table implementation where agents make public announcements
simply about their rankings of deterministic outcomes (Theorem 4). Whereas the justi-
2Our main result also improves on previous revelation principles by using the largest class of game
trees for which choices determine outcomes (Alo´s-Ferrer and Ritzberger, 2016); as a side contribution,
we provide a new description of this class (Proposition 1).
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fication for ordinal mechanisms provided by Carroll (2017) relies on interdependence of
agents’ preferences over lotteries, ours does not due to our stronger solution concept.
Finally, we consider ordinary strategy-proofness (SP) in the context of round table
mechanisms. As an immediate corollary to Theorem 2, if no round table mechanism
provides an SP-implementation for a deterministic rule, then the rule has no OSP-
implementation at all. Remarkably, the converse is true as well, providing a characteri-
zation of the deterministic rules with OSP-implementations: a deterministic rule has an
OSP-implementation if and only if it has a SP-implementation through a round table
mechanism (Theorem 5).3 Thus any investigation of OSP-implementation for a partic-
ular deterministic rule can be performed entirely using a familiar solution concept and a
simple class of game forms.
1.3 Related revelation principles
In this section, we provide a detailed comparison of our Proposition 2 for deterministic
rules to the other revelation principles in the literature.
A revelation principle takes the following form: if a rule can be implemented through a
game form in class ΓBIG, then it can be implemented through one in class ΓSMALL ⊆ ΓBIG.
Such a statement is made logically stronger when ΓBIG is made larger, as well as when
ΓSMALL is made smaller. Independently of this work, a series of closely-related revelation
principles for obvious strategy-proofness were established in recent working papers (Ash-
lagi and Gonczarowski, 2016; Pycia and Troyan, 2017; Bade and Gonczarowski, 2017),
and this section is dedicated to discussing the relationship between our revelation prin-
ciple and these three.4 We remark that in each of these other papers, the revelation
principle is not the primary contribution, but rather plays the role of a lemma toward
the main result.
Ashlagi and Gonczarowski (2016) take ΓBIG to be the class of game forms with perfect
recall, as in Li (2016), and first observe that it is without loss of generality to restrict
attention to Γ1, the class of game forms with perfect information where nature (alterna-
tively, the mechanism’s administrator) does not randomize.
Pycia and Troyan (2017) also take ΓBIG to be the class of game forms with perfect
recall. Under preference restrictions that allow for a wide range of economic environments
(such as object allocation), but rule out those with monetary transfers, they show that it
is without loss of generality to restrict attention to Γ2, their class of millipede mechanisms.
These mechanisms have remarkable further structure: at any information set, an agent
may or may not have one passing action, after which he may move again; each of his other
actions is a clinching actions, guaranteeing that the outcome belongs to a particular one
of his indifference classes, after which he does not move again.
Bade and Gonczarowski (2017) take ΓBIG to be the class of game forms for which
no path from the root intersects the same information set twice; this class is larger than
the class of game forms with perfect recall (because, for example, an agent may ‘forget’
the previous action he selected), but smaller than ours (because, for example, an agent
may not ‘forget’ whether or not he has already selected an action). They show that it
3I am indebted to Shengwu Li for conjecturing Theorem 5 to me through private correspondence.
4To my knowledge, Ashlagi and Gonczarowski (2016), Pycia and Troyan (2017), Bade and
Gonczarowski (2017), and this paper were made publicly available in that order. I became aware of
the other three papers after completing this paper.
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is without loss of generality to restrict attention to Γ3, their class of gradual revelation
mechanisms. These are our round table mechanisms with additional structure:
• no agent consecutively moves twice, or ever selects from a singleton set of actions,
and
• whenever an agent’s strategy guarantees (from some history) that all possible out-
comes belong to the same indifference class regardless of his preference relation, the
first action of that strategy is to publicly announce his preference relation (and take
no further action thereafter).
Because Γ3 is a subset of our class of round table mechanisms, the result of Bade and
Gonczarowski (2017) can be used to immediately strengthen our main result; we do not
do so in the body of this paper in the interest of clarity about credit among recent working
papers.
With respect to these other revelation principles, our contribution is not to further
shrink ΓSMALL, but rather to enlarge ΓBIG. In particular, we drop all recall requirements
and work with the largest class of game trees for which choices determine plays.
2 Base Model
2.1 Overview
A group of agents N = {1, 2, ..., n} face a set of (public) outcomes X. Each agent i has
private information summarized by his type θi ∈ Θi, which determines his (complete and
transitive) preference relation Rθi ranking outcomes. Critically, an agent’s ranking of
outcomes is fixed; it would not change were he to learn anything about his peers’ types,
ruling out for example auctions for mineral rights (Milgrom and Weber, 1982). A type
profile θ = (θi)i∈N specifies a type for each agent, and the set of possible type profiles is
given by Θ ≡ ×i∈NΘi.
In our base model, the agents wish to condition the outcome selection on their col-
lective information according to some deterministic rule f : Θ → X. Because the type
profile is not common knowledge, their objective is to weakly implement f according to
a particular solution concept using a game form (or mechanism).
In this section, we introduce the base model for deterministic rules and pure strategies.
We begin with our class of mechanisms; describing the associated class of game trees
involves a digression on order theory (Section 2.2). We then introduce the solution concept
of obvious strategy-proofness for pure strategies (Section 2.3). Finally, we describe when
a mechanism implements a deterministic rule, in the sense that the rule’s recommendation
is plausibly reached no matter the type profile (Section 2.4). Our presentation of these
notions in this section allows us to then simply describe each of our main results using
an appropriate extension of the base model.
2.2 Extensive game forms
To implement the rule, we consider extensive game forms (Osborne and Rubinstein, 1994;
Li, 2016). Intuitively, this is an extensive-form game tree without preference informa-
tion, which becomes an extensive-form game when paired with (the preference profile
associated with) a type profile.
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An extensive game form involves a game tree, which in its most general formulation is
a collection of histories H that is partially ordered by precedence -. So that our revelation
principle may be compatible with as many game trees as possible, we begin by reviewing
some concepts from order theory. For a fixed set H, a partial order - is a binary relation
that is reflexive, antisymmetric, and transitive, but not necessarily complete; we denote
the associated strict order by ≺. For each pair h, h′ ∈ H, if h ≺ h′ and there is no h′′
such that h ≺ h′′ ≺ h′, then we say both that
(i) h is an immediate predecessor of h′, and
(ii) h′ is an immediate successor of h.
A subset H ′ ⊆ H is a chain if for each pair h, h′ ∈ H ′, either h - h′ or h′ - h; a chain H ′
is maximal if there is no chain H ′′ such that H ′ ( H ′′; a subset H ′ ⊆ H is well-ordered
if for each H ′′ ⊆ H ′, H ′′ has a minimum (in which case H ′ is a chain). For each pair
h, h′ ∈ H, the meet of h and h′, h∧ h′ ∈ H, is the greatest lower bound of {h, h′}, which
is unique if it exists.
Definition: A meet-semilattice is a partially ordered set (H,-) such that for each pair
h, h′ ∈ H, there is h ∧ h′.
Definition: A tree (see the Jech, 1971 survey) is a partially ordered set (H,-) such
that for each h ∈ H, {h′ ∈ H|h′ - h} is well-ordered. It is rooted if there is minH.
For our purposes, a maximal chain is a play, or a complete description of a sequence
of choices, and a game tree is “admissible” if choices always induce a unique play. This
notion is made precise in Alo´s-Ferrer and Ritzberger (2016), and we refer the reader there
for the precise definition. The result that interests us here is the following:
Theorem (Alo´s-Ferrer and Ritzberger, 2016):5 A rooted “pseudotree” is “ad-
missible” if and only if it satisfies “weak up-discreteness,” “coherence,” and “regularity.”
We use this alternative statement involving notions we find more familiar:
Proposition 1: The class of meet-semilattice trees is the class of “admissible” rooted
“pseudotrees.”
The proof is in Appendix A. When describing these game forms, it is convenient
to view the (mechanism) administrator as player 0 and write N0 ≡ N ∪ {0} for the
set of agents together with the administrator. The administrator publicly commits to
how he will behave in advance, playing the same role as the ‘chance player’ or ‘nature’
in the literature on games. Following Aumann (1964), we include how choices can be
randomized in our description; we here include only states for the administrator, and
later extend the base model with different kinds of states for the agents. Formally:
Definition: An extensive game form is given by a tuple
〈H,-, A,A, P, (Ii)i∈N , g, (Ωh)h∈H0 , (Bh)h∈H0〉, where
5This is first proven in Alo´s-Ferrer and Ritzberger (2008) with a minor error, which is corrected in
Alo´s-Ferrer, Kern, and Ritzberger (2011). We refer the reader to Alo´s-Ferrer and Ritzberger (2016) for
this result’s most complete treatment.
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1. H is the set of histories and - is the partial order on H representing precedence.
We require that (H,-) is a meet-semilattice tree. These conditions guarantee that
choices always determine a unique play, guarantee that there is a unique initial
history h∅ which precedes all others, and allow an action to be viewed as the selection
of an immediate successor. We let σ(h) denote the immediate successors of h. A
play is a maximal chain, which gives a complete description of a sequence of choices;
we write pi for a play and Π for the set of plays. A terminal history is a history
with no successor; we write z for a terminal history and Z for the (possibly empty)
set of terminal histories.
2. A is the set of actions and A : ∪Hσ(h) → A is the action function, which at each
history h associates each immediate successor h′ ∈ σ(h) with the action taken to
reach it. We require that at any history, each available action determines a unique
next history: for each h ∈ H and each pair h′, h′′ ∈ σ(h), A(h′) 6= A(h′′). For each
history h, we let A(h) ≡ ∪h′∈σ(h)A(h′) denote the actions available at h.
3. P : H\Z → N0 is the player function, which associates each non-terminal history
with whoever selects an action at that history—either an agent or the administrator.
For each i ∈ N0, we let Hi ≡ {h ∈ H|P (h) = i} denote the histories that belong to
i. Similarly HN ≡ {h ∈ H|P (h) ∈ N}.
4. for each i ∈ N , Ii is the information partition for i, which specifies the information
sets partitioning Hi. We require that for each pair h, h
′ in the same information
set Ii, the same actions are available: A(h) = A(h
′). We write A(Ii) for the actions
A(h) available at each history h ∈ Ii. Across all histories in a given information set
Ii, i must behave the same way. Implicitly, the administrator’s information set I0
consists only of singletons.
5. g : Π→ X is the outcome function, which associates each play with an outcome.
6. at each h ∈ H0, there is a set of states Ωh with which the administrator can condition
his action at h, and the administrator commits to Bh : Ωh → A(h) specifying how
he will condition his act on the state’s realization. In other words, the administrator
commits to a behavioral strategy.
Let Γ denote the class of extensive game forms (with agents in N and outcomes in X).
2.3 Solution Concept
For the rest of this section, fix an extensive game form G. While an agent is restricted
to pure strategies, he may worry that his opponents are somehow able to avoid this
restriction. We therefore also introduce “choice functions” that agents are forbidden
from selecting; these can be thought of as realizations of behavioral strategies that are
not necessarily pure strategies.
Definition: Kinds of strategies for agent i.
• a choice function for i is a mapping Ci which associates each history h ∈ Hi with
an available action C(h) ∈ A(h). We use Ci for the set of choice functions of i, C
for the set of choice function profiles, and C−i for the set of lists of choice functions
from the agents other than i.
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• a pure strategy for i is a choice function for i with the restriction that if h and
h′ share an information set, then S(h) = S(h′). We use Si for the set of pure
strategies of i, S for the set of pure strategy profiles, and S−i for the set of lists of
pure strategies from the agents other than i.
A solution concept specifies a collection of strategy profiles for each game—in practice,
typically the strategy profiles that are deemed ‘plausible’ in some particular sense. Here,
we are only interested in games formed by pairing some extensive game form with (the
preference profile associated with) a type profile: the domain is Γ×Θ, and each (G, θ) is
associated with a collection in 2S .
Our solution concept involves the repeated comparison of one’s strategy to alternatives
over the course of play. To speak of strategy evaluation at a given information set,
we write piG(h,C,C0), or sometimes pi
G(h,Ci, C−i, C0), for the resulting play when we
start from h and play proceeds according to (C,C0), and we write x
G(h,C,C0) for the
associated outcome g(piG(h,C,C0)). These functions are well-defined (see Alo´s-Ferrer and
Ritzberger, 2016 and Appendix A). For each choice function Ci ∈ Ci, define the reachable
histories for Ci and the reachable information sets for Ci by:
Hi(Ci) ≡ {h ∈ Hi| there are C−i, C0 such that h ∈ piG(h∅, Ci, C−i, C0)}, and
Ii(Ci) ≡ {Ii ∈ Ii| there is h ∈ Ii such that h ∈ Hi(Ci)}.
In particular, Ii(Ci) is the collection of information sets where i could possibly find
himself if he has been playing according to Ci, provided that any peer could realize any
choice function through a behavioral strategy. We use the notation Ii(Si) when the choice
function is a pure strategy.
Definition: Obviously dominant strategies for a fixed game (G, θ).
• A pure strategy Si ∈ Si is obviously S-dominant if for each Ii ∈ Ii(Si), each pair
h, h′ ∈ Ii, each S ′i ∈ Si such that Si(Ii) 6= S ′i(Ii),6 each pair S−i, S ′−i ∈ S−i, and
each pair ωH0 , ω
′
H0
∈ ΩH0 ,
xG(h, Si, S−i, B0(ωH0))
Ri
xG(h′, S ′i, S
′
−i, B0(ω
′
H0
)).
• A pure strategy Si ∈ Si is obviously C-dominant if for each Ii ∈ Ii(Si), each pair
h, h′ ∈ Ii, each C ′i ∈ Ci such that Si(Ii) 6= C ′i(Ii), each pair C−i, C ′−i ∈ C−i, and each
pair C0, C
′
0 ∈ C0,
xG(h, Si, C−i, C0)
Ri
xG(h′, C ′i, C
′
−i, C
′
0).
6In the original definition (Li, 2016), Si need only be compared to S
′
i if moreover S
′
i can reach Ii.
The two definitions are not equivalent when there is absent-mindedness, but the results in this paper
hold for both definitions, essentially because any additional paths from Ii that must be considered under
the given definition can never be reached and can thus be safely pruned from the game tree. We work
with the given definition for its conceptual simplicity: at a given information set, the agent considers
switching to any strategy that prescribes a different action.
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In order for a pure strategy Si to be obviously S-dominant, it must pass a series of
comparisons at each reachable information set. In particular, at each reachable informa-
tion set, Si must be compared to each pure strategy S
′
i that prescribes a different action.
In order for Si to pass this comparison, each possible outcome under Si must be at least
as desirable as each possible outcome under S ′i.
The latter notion is much stronger: if a pure strategy is obviously C-dominant, then
not only is it obviously S-dominant, but moreover, the agent entertains the possibilities
that:
• he may later discover a way to coordinate across histories that share an information
set,
• his opponents may later discover a way to coordinate across histories that share an
information set, and
• the administrator may deviate from his announced behavioral strategy.
Under the interpretation that each player is a group with different representatives making
choices at different histories (Isbell, 1957), obvious C-dominance requires each represen-
tative to contemplate the possibility that representatives of its group, or another group,
may discover a way to illegally coordinate.
Our solution concept is that each agent plays an obviously dominant strategy.
Definition: Obvious strategy-proofness.
• A pure strategy profile S belongs to OSPS(G, θ) if and only if for each agent i, Si
is obviously S-dominant.
• A pure strategy profile S belongs to OSPC(G, θ) if and only if for each agent i, Si
is obviously C-dominant.
2.4 Implementation
A game form is a game with incomplete information; in particular, preference information
is missing. In the context of a mechanism design model, we can say more specifically
that the type profile is unknown. Following Harsanyi (1967), suppose the administrator
imagines that each agent i is drawn from a population partitioned by types in Θi, and
considers one plausible strategy for each type class. A Harsanyi pure strategy is a mapping
Si : Θi → Si.
Informally, we say that a game form implements a rule if there is some Harsanyi
strategy profile such that no matter how the administrator plays, for each type profile,
the associated strategy profile (i) is plausible according to our solution concept, and (ii)
yields the rule’s recommendation. Formally:
Definition: Obvious strategy-proof implementation.
• A deterministic rule f is OSPS-implementable if there are
(i) G ∈ Γ, and
(ii) an associated Harsanyi pure strategy profile S,
such that for each θ ∈ Θ,
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(i) (Si(θi)) ∈ OSPS(G, θ), and
(ii) for each ωH0 ∈ ΩH0 ,
xG(h∅, (Si(θi))i∈N , B0(ωH0)) = f(θ).
In this case we say G OSPS-implements f through S.
• A deterministic rule f is OSPC-implementable if there are
(i) G ∈ Γ, and
(ii) an associated Harsanyi pure strategy profile S,
such that for each θ ∈ Θ,
(i) (Si(θi)) ∈ OSPC(G, θ), and
(ii) for each ωH0 ∈ ΩH0 ,
xG(h∅, (Si(θi))i∈N , B0(ωH0)) = f(θ).
In this case we say G OSPC-implements f through S.
Of these two implementation notions, the latter is stronger.
2.5 Round table mechanisms and base revelation principle
The revelation principle for deterministic rules involves the following canonical class of
mechanisms:
Definition: A round table mechanism is a perfect-information game form such that
each non-terminal history h belongs to some agent i ∈ N . Moreover, actions in A(h)
are subsets of Θi, and any two actions in A(h) are pairwise disjoint. At any history of
i with no strict predecessor belonging to i, the union of actions in A(h) is Θi; at any
other history h of i, the union of actions in A(h) is the intersection of the actions at all
predecessors that lead to h. The class of round table mechanisms is denoted ΓRT .
Definition: A deterministic rule has a round table implementation if there is G ∈ ΓRT
such that G OSPS-implements f through S, where for each i ∈ N , each θi ∈ Θi, and
each h ∈ Hi(Si(θi)), Si(θi)(h) is the unique action solving
θi ∈ Si(θi)(h).
We note that OSPS-implementation with a round table mechanism implies OSPC-
implementation. The logic is simple: in a round table mechanism, each choice function
is a pure strategy.
Our statement of the revelation principle for deterministic rules improves on other
statements by allowing all game forms for which choices determine plays and removing
all recall assumptions:
Proposition 2: If a deterministic rule has an OSPS-implementation, then it has a
round table implementation, which is an OSPC-implementation.
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The proof is in Appendix B. This result is both a lemma for, and a corollary to, two
of our main results: Theorem 1 for implementation of stochastic rules and Theorem 3 for
robustness to player randomization.
3 Main Results
3.1 Revelation principle for stochastic rules
Our main result generalizes Proposition 2 to the case where agents wish to condition a
probabilistic distribution of outcomes on their collective information. A key step in this
generalization is the elegant argument in Lemma 2 of Pycia and Troyan (2017) that all
of the administrator’s randomization can be done at the initial history; we provide this
argument in our proof with some additional formality.
In order to pursue stochastic rules, we equip the set of outcomes X with a σ-algebra
X ⊆ 2X of measurable collections of outcomes. A lottery is a probability measure p : X →
[0, 1], and we denote the set of lotteries by P . A stochastic rule is a function f : Θ→ P .
We consider only pure strategies for the implementation of stochastic rules, as issues
quickly arise when the agents themselves randomize (see Example 1 in Section 3.3). To
extend the base model, the minimal additional structure we require is a σ-algebra A on
ΩH0 and a probability measure µ : A → [0, 1], allowing the assignment of probabilities to
measurable events upon which the administrator conditions. Let us call an extensive game
form together with this additional structure (G,A, µ) a minimally-probabilistic extensive
game form, and let ΓMP denote their class. We adapt our implementation notion as
follows:
Definition: Random obvious strategy-proof implementation.
• A stochastic rule f is random OSPS-implementable if there are
(i) (G,A, µ) ∈ ΓMP , and
(ii) an associated Harsanyi pure strategy profile S,
such that for each θ ∈ Θ,
(i) (Si(θi)) ∈ OSPS(G, θ), and
(ii) for each X ′ ∈ X ,
{ωH0 ∈ ΩH0|xG(h∅, (Si(θi))i∈N , B0(ωH0)) ∈ X ′} ∈ A, and
µ
({ωH0 ∈ ΩH0|xG(h∅, (Si(θi))i∈N , B0(ωH0)) ∈ X ′}) = f(θ)(X ′).
In this case we say G random OSPS-implements f through S.
• A stochastic rule f is random OSPC-implementable if there are
(i) (G,A, µ) ∈ ΓMP , and
(ii) an associated Harsanyi pure strategy profile S,
such that for each θ ∈ Θ,
(i) (Si(θi)) ∈ OSPC(G, θ), and
(ii) for each X ′ ∈ X ,
{ωH0 ∈ ΩH0|xG(h∅, (Si(θi))i∈N , B0(ωH0)) ∈ X ′} ∈ A, and
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µ
({ωH0 ∈ ΩH0|xG(h∅, (Si(θi))i∈N , B0(ωH0)) ∈ X ′}) = f(θ)(X ′).
In this case we say G random OSPC-implements f through S.
We note that it is sometimes possible to represent the probabilities specified by µ
as calculations involving independent probabilities across different histories in H0, for
example when each of the administrator’s state spaces is the unit interval together with
the Lebesgue measurable sets and the Lebesgue measure (Aumann, 1964). Our approach
does not require any such restrictions, and even allows the administrator to correlate his
choices across histories. Finally, we remark that as long as values of µ can be assigned to
the events specified above, a suitable A can be recovered.7
We emphasize that this notion of random implementation does not require lotteries to
be assigned to terminal nodes. Given such a game form, one could replace each terminal
node with a move by the administrator where he randomly selects an outcome according
to the associated lottery. One could also consider game forms where the administrator
randomizes at various histories scattered throughout the game tree. In each of these
cases, it is possible for a stochastic rule to be implemented.
In our canonical class of mechanisms, the administrator moves once and only once,
beginning play by selecting a round table mechanism for the agents:
Definition: A randomized round table mechanism is a perfect-information minimally-
probabilistic extensive game form such that the initial history belongs to the administra-
tor 0, and every other non-terminal history h belongs to some agent i ∈ N . Moreover, at
each history h of player i, actions in A(h) are subsets of Θi, and any two actions in A(h)
are pairwise disjoint. At any history of i with no strict predecessor belonging to i, the
union of actions in A(h) is Θi; at any other history h of i, the union of actions in A(h) is
the intersection of the actions at all predecessors that lead to h. The class of randomized
round table mechanisms is denoted ΓRRT .
Definition: A stochastic rule has a randomized round table implementation if there is
(G,A, µ) ∈ ΓRRT such that (G,A, µ) OSPS-implements f through S, where for each
i ∈ N , each θi ∈ Θi, and each h ∈ Hi(Si(θi)), Si(θi)(h) is the unique action solving
θi ∈ Si(θi)(h).
We note that random OSPS-implementation with a randomized round table mecha-
nism implies random OSPC-implementation: each choice function is a pure strategy, and
the administrator is done playing at each player history. Our main result is that it is safe
to restrict attention to this class:
Theorem 1: If a stochastic rule has a random OSPS-implementation, then it has a
randomized round table implementation, which is a random OSPC-implementation.
7To see this, for each θ ∈ Θ, consider the mapping xGθ : ΩH0 → X that takes each state profile ωH0
to the outcome xG(h∅, (Si(θi))i∈N , B0(ωH0)). Because X is a σ-algebra, it is well known that the inverse
images of xGθ form a σ-algebra Aθ. Moreover, it is well-known that an arbitrary intersection of σ-algebras
is itself a σ-algebra; thus A may be taken to be ∩Aθ. It is straightforward to complete the measure µ
from the given probabilities.
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The proof is in Appendix C. In the next section, we establish that this generalization
is necessary, in the sense that it is not safe to restrict attention to the canonical class for
deterministic rules.
3.2 Insufficiency of round table mechanisms for stochastic rules
In this section, we demonstrate by means of a simple example that Proposition 2 should
not be used when investigating the implementation of stochastic rules.
There is a set of agents N = {1, 2, 3} with generic members i, j, k and a set of objects
{A,B,C} with generic members a, b, c. An allocation is a bijection between the agents
and objects, associating each agent with his own object, and an outcome in X is a lottery
over allocations. For each i ∈ N , Θi is the set of von Neumann-Morgenstern utility
representations of preferences over lotteries of objects; as there is no indifference, we
normalize so that for each θi, there is some m satisfying 9 > m > 0 such that the range
of θi is {0,m, 9}.
Definition: For each strict order of agents i then j then k, the rule f i,j,k gives i his
favorite object, j his favorite of the other two objects, and k the remaining object. The
random serial dictatorship f is given by the uniform randomization over these rules:
f ≡ 1
6
∑
f i,j,k.
Theorem 2: Random serial dictatorship has no round table implementation.
The proof is in Appendix D. When paired with the observation by Pycia and Troyan
(2017) that random serial dictatorship does have a randomized round table implementa-
tion, Theorem 2 establishes that Theorem 1 is a necessary generalization of Proposition 2
for the implementation of stochastic rules.
3.3 Robustness to player randomization
Does our revelation principle hold if, as assumed throughout most of game theory, the
players might randomize? The answer depends on how this question is made precise,
which involves a series of subtle modeling choices. We proceed briefly through the same
steps from Section 3, occasionally pausing to highlight a choice of conceptual interest.
First of all, how should we model player randomization? Though for game forms
with perfect recall, behavioral strategies are equivalent to mixed strategies (Kuhn, 1953;
Aumann, 1964), this is not true for all game forms we consider; we therefore consider both.
For our result, we are able to accommodate unusually general notions of randomization
that do not require probabilities:
• For mixed strategies, let us say a mixed extensive game form (G, (Ωi)i∈N) consists of
(i) an extensive game form G, and (ii) for each i ∈ N , a set of states Ωi with which
the player can condition his pure strategy in a mixed strategy. A mixed strategy
for i is a mapping Mi : Ωi → Si specifying how i conditions his selection of pure
strategy on the realization of a state at the start of the game. We use Mi, M,
and M−i to denote, respectively, the set of mixed strategies of i, the set of mixed
strategy profiles, and the set of lists of mixed strategies from agents other than i.
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• For behavioral strategies, let us say a behavioral extensive game form (G, (Ωh)h∈HN )
consists of (i) an extensive game form G, and (ii) at each h ∈ HN , a set of states Ωh
with which the player at h can condition his action at h in a behavioral strategy.
We require that for each pair h, h′ in the same information set, Ωh = Ωh′ ; each is
a copy of the other, though their realizations may be different. Thus at a given
information set, the agent cannot infer anything about his history simply by looking
at his state space. A behavioral strategy for i is a list of mappings B = (Bh)h∈Hi ,
where Bh : Ωh → A(h) specifies how i conditions his selection of an action at h
on the realization of a state at h, with the restriction that if h and h′ share an
information set, then Bh = Bh′ . We use Bi, B, and B−i to denote, respectively, the
set of mixed strategies of i, the set of mixed strategy profiles, and the set of lists of
mixed strategies from agents other than i.
While we do not require randomization to involve probabilities, the addition of further
familiar structure would of course not impact our results.8
In order to specify where an agent assesses a given strategy, we choose notions of
reachable information sets Ii(Mi) and Ii(Bi) that are analogous to our original definition,
simply modified to allow any realization of agent i’s states. The more interesting question
is when an agent assesses his strategy at a given information set: before or after states
are realized?
There is a subtle conceptual problem with taking an ex-ante approach, which is best
illustrated with behavioral strategies. At a given information set, suppose Bi and B
′
i
prescribe the same range of outcomes. Before the state is realized, there is a straight-
forward process for determining whether or not the two are equivalent: for each state,
check whether or not Bi and B
′
i prescribe the same action; if they agree at every state,
they are equivalent; otherwise, they are distinct. The problem is that this process in-
volves state-by-state contingent reasoning, and one of the primary motivations for obvious
strategy-proofness is the observation that subjects may have difficulty with such reason-
ing (Li, 2016). An agent without this ability who is tasked with making comparisons
before the state is realized would therefore either have to (i) compare a strategy to itself
or (ii) never compare a strategy to another that prescribes the same range of actions.
We believe that neither of these alternatives is in the spirit of the original notion, and
therefore use the following ex-post notions:
• For obvious M-dominance, we assume that before the game begins, the state ωi is
revealed to the agent, and this information is recorded and available thereafter. At
any given information set, then, each mixed strategy is already reduced to a pure
strategy.
• For obvious B-dominance, we do not assume that the agent has a record of every
state that is revealed to him over the course of the game; indeed, without perfect
recall, the agent may not even have a record of every action that he has taken. At
8For example, we could require for each state space: (i) a collection of events whose relative likelihood
can be compared; (ii) that this collection is a σ-algebra; (iii) that each agent’s likelihood comparisons
have representation by a probability measure; and (iv) that these probability measures all correspond
to some ‘objective’ measure. To guarantee that conditional probabilities can be defined and used to
calculate lotteries of outcomes, we could impose that these probability spaces are standard (Mackey,
1957), provide σ-algebras for acts and outcomes, and impose measurability restrictions on mappings
(Halmos, 1950; Aumann, 1964). To rule out strategy correlation (Aumann, 1987), we could impose that
the product state spaces are associated with their product σ-algebras and product measures.
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a given information set, however, the current state ωx is revealed, and the agent
takes this information into account when making comparisons—though he does not
know which of his information set’s histories he is playing from, and therefore does
not know which of these histories ωx belongs to.
For brevity, we omit the formal definitions of obvious M-dominance and obvious B-
dominance; these notions should be clear given this discussion and the analogous def-
inition for pure strategies. The solution concepts OSPM(G, θ) and OSPB(G, θ), for
mixed and behavioral strategies, respectively, are also analogous to the definition for
pure strategies.
We use Mi : θi →Mi for a Harsanyi mixed strategy and Bi : θi → Bi for a Harsanyi
behavioral strategy. Informally, we say that a game form implements a rule if there is
some Harsanyi strategy profile such that, for each type profile, the associated strategy
profile (i) is plausible according to our solution concept, and (ii) yields the rule’s recom-
mendation. There is one last subtle point that still must be addressed, however. Suppose
the mechanism administrator wishes to implement a deterministic rule, yet he and the
agents may randomize. When should we say he has succeeded? There are two natural
definitions:
1. for each θ ∈ Θ, the outcome is f(θ) for each joint realization of states, or
2. for each θ ∈ Θ, the outcome is f(θ) with probability 1.
Under the second notion, we are unable pursue our approach for our revelation principle,
as we cannot replace any randomized strategy with any of its realizations:
Example 1: There is one agent with one possible type, and there are two outcomes,
x and x′. The agent is indifferent between these outcomes, and the rule specifies that
x should be selected. In the extensive game form G, the agent first selects a number
from the unit interval, then does so once more, at which point the game ends. Moreover,
the agent is absent-minded; in particular, all histories share an information set. The
outcome function assigns x′ only when the same number is selected twice, and assigns x
otherwise. The behavioral strategy B selects a number from the unit interval using the
uniform distribution at the sole information set. Though (G,B) yields outcome x with
probability 1, for each pure strategy S and each mixed strategy M , (G,S) and (G,M)
both yield outcome x′ with probability 1.
We therefore use the first notion, which is stronger and allows us to use a less-
structured model. Thus our implementation notion is not that the rule’s recommendation
is selected almost surely, but rather that it is selected surely—for every realization of
states. For brevity, we omit the formal definitions for a rule to be OSPM-implementable
and OSPB-implementable; these notions should be clear given this discussion and the
analogous definition for pure strategies.
Altogether, we find that for deterministic rules, our revelation principle is robust to
player randomization:
Theorem 3: If a deterministic rule f is either
(i) OSPS-implementable,
(ii) OSPM-implementable, or
(iii) OSPB-implementable,
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then it has a round table implementation, which is an OSPC-implementation.
The proof is in Appendix E. On the one hand, we find that any deterministic rule that
can be implemented by taking advantage of agent randomization can also be implemented
with each agent playing a pure strategy, which is obviously dominant to him even if he
worries that the other agents might randomize. On the other hand, it is unclear that this
is true for stochastic rules. Altogether, then, while it is possible to reassure agents that
they need not randomize or worry about other agents randomizing, it is difficult to rely
on the agents to provide the desired randomization themselves; this should be provided
by the administrator.
3.4 Justification for ordinal mechanisms
In this section, we state a result inspired by a recent paper (Carroll, 2017), who seeks a
justification for stochastic rules that elicit only ordinal information from the agents about
their preferences over outcomes.
Suppose that we have a finite set of outcomes, and each agent’s type space consists
of von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions representing preferences over lotteries.
Moreover, each agent’s type is compatible with a strict ranking over outcomes. Let us
say that a stochastic rule is ordinal if for each i ∈ N , each θ−i ∈ Θ−i, and each pair
θi, θ
′
i ∈ Θi compatible with the same ranking, f(θi, θ−i) = f(θ′i, θ−i). In other words,
a stochastic rule is ordinal if it only depends on the agents’ rankings of deterministic
outcomes. Finally, let a randomized ordinal round table implementation be a randomized
round table implementation when each agent’s type space is replaced by the associated
space of rankings.
Theorem 4: Suppose there is a finite set of outcomes and each agent has a von Neumann-
Morgenstern type compatible with a strict ranking over outcomes. If a stochastic rule
f has a random OSPS-implementation, then f is ordinal and has a randomized ordinal
round table implementation.
The proof is in Appendix F. In this sense, obvious strategy-proofness provides a
foundation for ordinal mechanisms. This observation was inspired by Carroll (2017),
who provides a foundation involving the interdependence of the agents’ preferences over
lotteries. The alternative foundation offered here does not rely on interdependence as it
involves a stronger solution concept.
3.5 Round table mechanisms and ordinary strategy-proofness
It turns out to be fruitful to consider standard strategy-proofness in the context of
round table mechanisms, a point I am grateful to Shengwu Li for suggesting to me.
For brevity, we gather the necessary definitions, which were introduced in sequence for
obvious strategy-proofness, here:
Definition: Strategy-proofness.
• A pure strategy Si ∈ Si is dominant if for each S ′i ∈ Si, each S−i ∈ S−i, and each
ωH0 ∈ ΩH0 ,
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xG(h∅, Si, S−i, B0(ωH0))
Ri
xG(h∅, S ′i, S−i, B0(ωH0)).
• A pure strategy profile S belongs to SP(G, θ) if and only if for each agent i, Si is
dominant.
• A deterministic rule f is SP-implementable if there are
(i) G ∈ Γ, and
(ii) an associated Harsanyi pure strategy profile S,
such that for each θ ∈ Θ,
(i) (Si(θi)) ∈ SP(G, θ), and
(ii) for each ωH0 ∈ ΩH0 ,
xG(h∅, (Si(θi))i∈N , B0(ωH0)) = f(θ).
In this case we say G SP-implements f through S.
Which mechanisms SP-implement a given rule? It could be that there are none, but if
there are any, then by the standard revelation principle (Gibbard, 1973; Myerson, 1981),
at least one of them is a direct mechanism. Beyond this, very little is known in general,
but for our purposes, all that matters is whether or not one of them is a round table
mechanism:
Theorem 5: A deterministic rule f has an OSPC-implementation if and only if it has
a SP-implementation through a round table mechanism.
See Figure 1; the proof is in Appendix G. Thus the analysis of whether a deterministic
rule has an obviously strategy-proof implementation may be safely confined to a simple
class of mechanisms and a familiar solution concept.
Appendix A
In this appendix, we prove Proposition 1. We begin by summarizing some known results
about game trees. As we do not work directly with conditions in marked by quotation
marks, and the reader is referred to the cited sources for their definitions. By contrast,
we do work with the italicized conditions, which are defined after our summary.
We wish for our extensive game forms to be compatible with a large class of game
trees, subject to the “admissibility” requirement that any choices determine a unique
play. Fortunately, Alo´s-Ferrer and Ritzberger (2008) (henceforth, AFR) have provided
(independent) necessary and sufficient conditions:
Theorem (AFR, Theorem 6):9 A rooted pseudotree is “admissible” if and only if it
satisfies “weak up-discreteness,” “coherence,” and regularity.
9A correction to the definition of “admissible” is provided in Alo´s-Ferrer, Kern, and Ritzberger (2011),
and the most complete treatment of this result is given in Alo´s-Ferrer and Ritzberger (2016).
18
Figure 1: Theorem 5. For a given deterministic rule f , let Γf be the class of game forms
that SP-implement f . In general, Γf may be empty (not pictured). Otherwise, by the
classic revelation principle, Γf intersects the class of direct mechanisms. If Γf does not
intersect the class of round table mechanisms (left), then f has no OSP-implementation.
On the other hand, if Γf does intersect the class of round table mechanisms (right), then
those mechanisms in the intersection are OSP-implementations.
AFR work with set-based rooted pseudotrees, where each history is the collection of
plays that include it and precedence is set inclusion; this is without loss of generality
in a precise sense (Alo´s-Ferrer and Ritzberger, 2005b). Because “weak up-discreteness”
and “coherence” are together equivalent to up-discreteness (AFR, Corollary 3), “admis-
sibility” is equivalent to up-discreteness and regularity (AFR, Corollary 5). Moreover,
up-discreteness is equivalent to being a tree (Lemma AFR 1).
Furthermore, “admissibility” trivially implies “coherence” and regularity, which imply
“selectiveness” (AFR, Proposition 6b).10 “Selectiveness” implies “well-meeting” (AFR,
Footnote 27),11 which is equivalent to being a meet-semilattice (Alo´s-Ferrer and Ritzberger,
2005a). Additionally, “selectiveness” implies regularity (FR, Proposition 6a).
These existing results together imply a regular rooted tree is a meet-semilattice
(Lemma AFR 2). To assure the reader that this is indeed true in general for order-
theoretic pseudotrees, we provide a direct proof. We then make two novel observations:
a meet-semilattice pseudotree is regular (Lemma 1.1), and a meet-semilattice tree is
rooted (Lemma 1.2). It is immediate from the lemmas that “admissibility” is equivalent
to being a (necessarily rooted) meet-semilattice tree.
Throughout, we assume the Axiom of Choice, which is equivalent to the Hausdorff
Maximality Principle, which is equivalent to Zorn’s Lemma. The Axiom of Choice guar-
antees that strategies exist.
For each h ∈ H, let ↑ h ≡ {h′ ∈ H|h′ - h} and  h ≡ (↑ h\{h}) denote the weak
and strict predecessors of h, respectively. We restate the definitions from the text using
this notation:
Definition: A pseudotree (Koppelberg and Monk, 1991) is a partially ordered set (H,-)
such that for each h ∈ H, ↑ h is a chain. It is rooted if there is minH.
10In fact, they show that regularity and a condition weaker than “coherence” imply “selectiveness”.
11In this article, earlier histories are smaller, while in AFR, earlier histories are greater; thus we use
“well-meeting” in place of their “well-joining.”
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Definition: A tree (see the Jech, 1971 survey) is a partially ordered set (H,-) such
that for each h ∈ H, ↑ h is well-ordered.
Definition: A pseudotree (H,-) is up-discrete if each nonempty chain has a minimum.
The following observation appears in Alo´s-Ferrer and Ritzberger (2008); we provide
the simple proof for completeness:
Lemma AFR 1: A pseudotree is a tree if and only if it is up-discrete.
Proof: We prove the two implications in sequence.
[⇒] Let H ′ be a nonempty chain. Then there is h ∈ H ′. Since (H,-) is tree, there is
hm ≡ ↑ h. Let h′ ∈ H ′. Since H ′ is a chain, either h′ - h or h ≺ h′. In the former case,
h′ ∈ ↑ h, so hm - h′ by construction; in the latter case, hm - h ≺ h. Since h′ ∈ H ′ was
arbitrary, thus hm = minH
′.
[⇐] Let h ∈ H and let H ′ ⊆ ↑ h, H ′ 6= ∅. Since (H,-) is a pseudotree, thus ↑ h is a
chain, so H ′ is a nonempty chain. By up-discreteness, H ′ has a minimum. Since H ′ was
arbitrary, thus ↑ h is well-ordered. 
Before proceeding, we introduce some more notation. For each H∗ ⊆ H, let U(H∗)
denote the set of upper bounds of H∗. Recall that supH∗ = minU(H∗); since - is a
partial order, if supH∗ exists then it is unique. Similarly, let L(H∗) denote the set of
lower bounds of H∗, and recall that inf H∗ = maxL(H∗), which is unique if it exists.
Finally, we write h ∧ h′ for the meet of h and h′, inf{h, h′}, which is unique if it exists.
Definition: A meet-semilattice is a partially ordered set (H,-) such that for each pair
h, h′ ∈ H, there is h ∧ h′.
Definition: A pseudotree (H,-) is regular if for each h ∈ H such that ( h) 6= ∅, there
is sup( h).
We now prove the lemmas in sequence.
Lemma AFR 2: If a rooted tree is regular, then it is a meet-semilattice.
Proof: Let h, h′ ∈ H. If h and h′ can be compared, then trivially there is h∧h′ ∈ {h, h′},
so assume h and h′ cannot be compared.
Since (H,-) is a tree, both ↑ h and ↑ h′ are well-ordered. Since h ∈ (↑ h\↑ h′) and
h′ ∈ (↑ h′\↑ h), thus there are hm ≡ min(↑ h\↑ h′) and h′m ≡ min(↑ h′\↑ h). Notice that
hm and h
′
m cannot be compared: hm - h′m implies hm ∈ ↑ h′, while h′m - hm implies
h′m ∈ ↑ h.
Define H∗ ≡ ( hm). Since hm 6- h′m, thus hm is not the root, so H∗ is not empty as
it includes the root. We claim H∗ = ↑ h ∩ ↑ h′.
To see H∗ ⊆ ↑ h ∩ ↑ h′, let h∗ ∈ H∗. Then h∗ ≺ hm - h, so h∗ ∈ ↑ h. Since
h∗ ≺ hm = min(↑ h\↑ h′), thus h∗ ∈ ↑ h ∩ ↑ h′.
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Conversely, let h∗ ∈ ↑ h ∩ ↑ h′. Then h∗ 6∈ {hm, h′m}. Since ↑ h and ↑ h′ are chains,
thus h∗ can be compared to hm and h∗ can be compared to h′m. But we cannot have
hm ≺ h∗, else hm and h′m can be compared: if h∗ ≺ h′m, by transitivity; if h′m ≺ h∗,
because ↑ h∗ is a chain as (H,-) is a tree. Thus h∗ ≺ hm, so h∗ ∈ H∗.
Altogether, H∗ = ↑ h ∩ ↑ h′, as desired. We next claim H∗ has a maximum. Indeed,
assume by way of contradiction that H∗ has no maximum. Since H∗ = ( hm) is
nonempty, by regularity it has a supremum, so U(H∗) has a minimum. Since hm ∈ U(H∗),
and since h∗ ≺ hm implies h∗ ∈ H∗ which implies h∗ 6∈ U(H∗), thus hm = minU(H∗).
But H∗ ⊆ ↑ h′, so h′ ∈ U(H∗) and hm 6- h′, contradicting that hm = minU(H∗). Thus
H∗ has maximum h∗M , as desired.
Finally, we claim h∗M = h∧h′. Indeed, since h∗M = max ↑ h∩↑ h′, thus h∗M ∈ L({h, h′}).
Assume, by way of contradiction, there is h∗ ∈ L({h, h′}) such that h∗M ≺ h∗. Since ↑ h
is a chain, thus h∗ and hm can be compared. Moreover, h∗M = max hm and h∗M ≺ h∗,
so hm - h∗. But then hm - h∗ - h′, so hm ∈ ↑ h′, contradicting hm = min ↑ h\↑ h′.
Thus h∗M = maxL({h, h′}) = h ∧ h′, as desired. 
Lemma 1.1: If a pseudotree is a meet-semilattice, then it is regular.
Proof: Assume, by way of contradiction, (H,-) is not regular. Then there is h ∈ H
such that  h is nonempty with no supremum.
Assume, by way of contradiction,  h∩U( h) 6= ∅. Since (H,-) is a pseudotree, thus
 h is chain. Then for each pair h′, h′′ ∈  h ∩ U( h), since h′ 6- h′′ and h′′ 6- h′, thus
h′ ∼ h′′, so h′ = h′′. But then  h∩U( h) is a singleton, so there is min h∩U( h) =
max h = sup h, contradicting that there is no sup h. Thus  h ∩ U( h) = ∅, as
desired.
By construction, h ∈ U( h). Moreover, for each h′ ∈ H, h′ ≺ h implies h′ ∈  h,
which implies h′ 6∈ U( h). Since h 6= minU( h), and since h′ ∈ U( h) implies h′ 6≺ h,
thus there is h′ ∈ U( h) such that h and h′ cannot be compared.
Since (H,-) is a meet-semilattice, there is h∗ ≡ h ∧ h′. Since h and h′ cannot be
compared, thus h∗ 6∈ {h, h∗}, so h∗ ∈  h. Since  h is a chain with no maximum, there
is h∗∗ ∈  h such that h∗ ≺ h∗∗. But then since h, h′ ∈ U( h), thus h∗∗ ∈ L({h, h′})
and h∗ ≺ h∗∗, contradicting that h∗ = h ∧ h′. Thus (H,-) is regular, as desired. 
Lemma 1.2: Every meet-semilattice tree is rooted.
Proof: Let (H,-) satisfy the hypotheses. By Lemma AFR 1, (H,-) is up-discrete, so
each nonempty chain has a lower bound. Thus by Zorn’s Lemma, H has minimal element
h∅.
Assume, by way of contradiction, H has two distinct minimal elements h∅ and h′∅.
By meet-closure, there is h∗ ≡ h∅ ∧ h′∅. Since h∅ and h′∅ cannot be compared, thus
h∗ 6∈ {h∅, h′∅}. But then h∗ ≺ h∅, contradicting the minimality of h∅. Thus h∅ = minH. 
Altogether, we have established:
Proposition 1: The class of meet-semilattice trees is the class of “admissible” rooted
pseudotrees.
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Appendix B
In this appendix, we prove Proposition 2. The overall approach is to take an arbitrary
deterministic rule f and assume that some game form G OSPS-implements f through
some Harsanyi pure profile S, then successively transform the pair (G,S) until we have a
round table implementation of f .
We first remove all of the administrator’s moves; this involves ‘pruning’ off irrele-
vant branches as in Li (2016), as well as ‘squishing’ nodes that have a single immediate
successor. Formally:
Definition: Tree operations. Let (H,-) be a meet-semilattice tree, let H ′ ⊆ H be
nonempty, and let -′ be the restriction of - to H ′. Then
• (H ′,-′) is a pruning of (H,-) if there is E ⊆ H such that
H ′ = H\{h ∈ H| there is e ∈ E such that e - h}, and
• (H ′,-′) is a squishing of (H,-) if there is H∗ ⊆ H such that
(i) for each h∗ ∈ H∗, h∗ has one immediate successor in H, and
(ii) H ′ = H\H∗.
Because we use a particularly large game trees, one might worry that these operations
might result in an illegal partially ordered set. Fortunately, however, this is not the case.
First, we prove that pruning a meet-semilattice tree produces a meet-semilattice tree:
Lemma 2.1: If (H,-) is a meet-semilattice tree and (H ′,-′) is a pruning of (H,-), then
(H ′,-′) is a meet-semilattice tree.
Proof: Let (H,-) and (H ′,-′) be as in the hypothesis. Then there is E ⊆ H such that
H ′ = H\{h ∈ H| there is e ∈ E such that e - h}.
We first claim that for each h′ ∈ H ′, {h ∈ H ′|h - h′} = {h ∈ H|h - h′}. Indeed, let
h′ ∈ H ′. By construction, {h ∈ H ′|h - h′} ⊆ {h ∈ H|h - h′}. Conversely, let h ∈ H
such that h - h′, and assume, by way of contradiction, h 6∈ H ′. Then there is e ∈ E
such that e - h. But then by transitivity, e - h′, so h′ 6∈ H ′, contradicting h′ ∈ H ′.
Altogether, {h ∈ H ′|h - h′} = {h ∈ H|h - h′}, as desired.
To see (H ′,-′) is a tree, let h′ ∈ H ′. By the claim, h′ has the same predecessors in
H and H ′. Moreover, this set is well-ordered since (H,-) is a tree. Since h′ ∈ H ′ was
arbitrary, we are done.
To see (H ′,-′) is a meet-semilattice, let h, h′ ∈ H ′. Since h has the same predecessors
in H and H ′, and since h′ does as well, thus h and h′ have the same lower bounds in
H and H ′. Moreover, this set has a maximum since (H,-) is a meet-semilattice. Since
h, h′ ∈ H ′ were arbitrary, we are done. 
Squishing a meet-semilattice tree produces a meet-semilattice tree, as well:
Lemma 2.2: If (H,-) is a meet-semilattice tree and (H ′,-′) is a squishing of (H,-),
then (H ′,-′) is a meet-semilattice tree.
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Proof: Let (H,-) and (H ′,-′) be as in the hypothesis. Then there is H∗ ⊆ H such
that for each h∗ ∈ H∗, h∗ has one immediate successor in H, and (ii) H ′ = H\H∗.
To see (H ′,-′) is a tree, let h′ ∈ H ′ and let H∗ ⊆ {h ∈ H ′|h - h′}. Then H∗ ⊆ {h ∈
H|h - h′}. Since (H,-) is a tree, {h ∈ H|h - h′} is well-ordered, so H∗ has a minimum.
Since H∗ ⊆ {h ∈ H ′|h - h′} was arbitrary, thus {h ∈ H ′|h - h′} is well-ordered. Since
h′ ∈ H ′ was arbitrary, we are done.
Next, we claim that for each pair h, h∗ ∈ H, h∗ ≺ h implies h∗ has an immediate
successor h∗∗ ∈ H such that h∗∗ - h. Indeed, let h, h∗ ∈ H with h∗ ≺ h. Since (H,-)
is a tree and {h′ ∈ H|h∗ ≺ h′ - h} is a nonempty subset of {h′ ∈ H|h′ - h}, thus
{h′ ∈ H|h∗ ≺ h′ - h} has minimum h∗∗. There cannot be h∗∗∗ such that h∗ ≺ h∗∗∗ ≺ h∗∗,
else we would have h∗∗∗ ∈ {h′ ∈ H|h∗ ≺ h′ - h}, contradicting the minimality of h∗∗.
Thus h∗∗ ∈ H is an immediate successor of h∗ ∈ H such that h∗∗ - h, as desired.
Assume, by way of contradiction, (H ′,-′) is not a meet-semilattice. Then there are
h, h′ ∈ H ′ with no meet in H ′. Since (H,-) is a meet-semilattice, h and h′ have meet h∗
in H. If h∗ were in H ′, then it would be the meet of h and h′ in H ′, which does not exist;
thus h∗ ∈ H\H ′. In particular, h∗ 6∈ {h, h′}, so h∗ ≺ h and h∗ ≺ h′. By the claim, h∗ has
immediate successors h∗∗ and h∗∗∗ such that h∗∗ - h and h∗∗∗ - h′. But h∗ ∈ H\H ′, so
h∗ has a unique immediate successor, so h∗∗ = h∗∗∗, so h∗∗ is a lower bound of h and h′
that is greater than h∗, contradicting that h∗ is the meet of h and h′. 
At this point, we proceed to take pairs (G,S) and transform them into pairs (T (G), T (S))
according to a series of transformations T while preserving implementation. As promised,
the first transformation removes the administrator from the game form:
Definition: Transformation TωH0 .
• For each ωH0 ∈ ΩH0 , define TωH0 (G) by G′ = 〈H ′,-′, A′,A′, P ′, (I ′i)i∈N , g′〉:
(i) C0 ≡ B0(ωH0),
(ii) E ≡ ∪h∈H0{h′ ∈ σ(h)|A(h′) 6= C0(h)}
(iii) H∗ ≡ H\{h ∈ H| there is e ∈ E such that e - h},
(iv) H ′ ≡ H∗\H0, and
(v) everything else is the associated restriction.
• Given S for G, let TωH0 (S) be the associated restriction for TωH0 (G).
Lemma 2.3: If G ∈ Γ OSPS-implements f through S, then for each ωH0 ∈ ΩH0 , TωH0 (G)
OSPS-implements f through TωH0 (S).
We omit the proof as the notation obscures the logic. For a fixed realization of the
administrator’s states, the transformation first removes all successors of any node that the
administrator passes over, then squishes the administrator’s nodes. This is a composition
of squishing with pruning, so the resulting game tree is admissible. In the transformed
game form, whenever an agent i evaluates a given strategy Si, there are fewer possibilities;
thus the worst-case scenario for Si can only improve, while the best-case scenario across
alternatives can only worsen. Because this is true across agents and type profiles, OSPS-
implementation is preserved.
With the administrator removed, we next remove absent-mindedness. For a given
history h, let E(h) denote the earliest predecessor of h that shares an information set
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with h, which is well-defined in a tree as the predecessors of h are well-ordered. If
E(h) ≺ h, let α(h) denote the unique action at E(h) that yields a history which precedes
h.
Definition: Transformation Ti.
• For each i ∈ N , define Ti(G) by G′ = 〈H ′,-′, A′,A′, P ′, (I ′i)i∈N , g′〉:
(i) H∗i ≡ {h ∈ Hi|E(h) ≺ h},
(ii) E ≡ ∪h∈H∗i {h′ ∈ σ(h)|A(h′) 6= α(h)},
(iii) H∗ ≡ H\{h ∈ H| there is e ∈ E such that e - h},
(iv) H∗∗ ≡ {h ∈ Hi||σ(h)| = 1},
(v) H ′ ≡ H∗\H∗∗, and
(vi) everything else is the associated restriction.
• Given S for G, let Ti(S) be the associated restriction for Ti(G).
Lemma 2.4: If G ∈ Γ OSPS-implements f through S, then for each i ∈ N , Ti(G)
OSPS-implements f through Ti(S).
Again, we omit the proof as the notation obscures the logic. Suppose agent i has some
history h that is strictly preceded by other histories in its information set, the earliest
of which is E(h). If i has any pure strategies that can reach h,12 then all prescribe the
action α(h) at E(h), and thus also prescribe α(h) at h. Any histories that follow from a
choice other than α(h) at h, then, are impossible, and are pruned in the transformation.
After the pruning, h only has one remaining immediate successor, and at this point is
squished. Thus the transformation is again a composition of a squishing and a pruning,
and in the transformed game form, i is not absent-minded. The rule’s recommendation is
still reached at each type profile, as only impossible plays have been removed. Moreover,
i evaluates each strategy at fewer information sets, and as in the previous transformation,
for each agent there are fewer possibilities at each information set; altogether, OSPS-
implementation is again preserved. The composition of the Ti transformations across
N yields a game form with no absent-mindedness where each history has at least two
immediate successors.
Let Γ∗ ⊆ Γ be the subclass of game forms without absent-mindedness. At this point,
we remove imperfect information entirely, a possibility first observed by Ashlagi and
Gonczarowski (2016):
Definition: Transformation T∗.
• For each i ∈ N , define Ti(G) by G′ = 〈H,-, A,A, P, (I ′i)i∈N , g〉:
(i) for each i ∈ N , I ′i ≡ {{h}|h ∈ Hi}, and
(ii) everything else is the same.
• Given S for G, let T∗(S) be the associated restriction for T∗(G).
12It could, of course, be the case that i cannot reach one of his histories h with any pure strategy. For
example, suppose all of i’s histories share an information set; at each history, the available actions are
Left, Center, and Right; and reaching h requires a Left and then a Right.
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Lemma 2.5 (Ashlagi and Gonczarowski, 2016): If G ∈ Γ∗ OSPS-implements f
through S, then T∗(G) OSPS-implements f through T∗(S).
We omit this proof for the same reason we omitted the last two. Because there is
no absent-mindedness, each history is a possibility compatible with some pure strategy
profile. When information sets are split into singletons, then, each agent considers fewer
possibilities at each information set; as with the previous transformations, this implies
that OSPS-implementation is preserved.
We remark that Lemma 2.5 would not hold if the original game form included absent-
mindedness, as in this case the splitting of information sets could create new possibilities
for agents to consider:
Example 2: There is one agent with one possible type, and there are two outcomes,
x and x′. The agent prefers x, but the rule f specifies that x′ should be selected. The
extensive game form G is borrowed from the absent-minded driver game (Piccione and
Rubinstein, 1997): the agent first selects whether to stay or exit; if he exits, the game
ends; if he stays, then he selects a second time whether to stay or exit, and in either case
the game ends. The agent is absent-minded: both histories share an information set.
The outcome function assigns x only to stay-exit, and assigns x′ otherwise. Though G
OSPS-implements f through the pure exit strategy, T∗(G) does not OSPS-implement f .
Thus the order in which these transformations are applied is important. That said, if
they are applied in the order they are presented, the resulting game form is one of perfect
information. At this point, we can apply a final transformation due to Li (2016) for game
forms with perfect recall:
Definition: Transformation TS.
• For each S, define TS(G) by G′ = 〈H ′,-′, A′,A′, P ′, (I ′i)i∈N , g′〉:
(i) H ′ ≡ {h ∈ H| there is θ ∈ Θ such that h ∈ piG(h∅, (Si(θi))i∈N)}, and
(ii) everything else is the associated restriction.
• Given S for G, let TS(S) be the associated restriction for TS(G).
Theorem L (Li, 2016): If perfect recall G OSPS-implements f through S, then TS(G)
OSPS-implements f through TS(S).
This last result allows us to use S to prune off unused parts of the game tree, and
therefore to label each action with the collection of types who take it. Altogether, we
have established:
Proposition 2: If a deterministic rule has an OSPS-implementation, then it has a
round table implementation, which is an OSPC-implementation.
Appendix C
In this appendix, we prove Theorem 1:
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Theorem 1: If a stochastic rule has a random OSPS-implementation, then it has a
randomized round table implementation, which is a random OSPC-implementation.
Proof: Suppose (G,A, µ) random OSPS-implements f through S.
Let ωH0 ∈ ΩH0 . As argued for Lemma 2.3, fixing this realization of the administrator’s
states, we may first remove all successors of any node that the administrator passes
over, then squish the administrator’s nodes, resulting in an admissible game tree and
preserving random OSPS-implementation. Unlike Lemma 2.3, however, the transformed
game random OSPS-implements a different rule: we previously had implementation of
a stochastic rule, and now have implementation of a deterministic rule. Relabel each
remaining history h as hωH0 , let (SωH0i )i∈N denote the associated restriction of S, and let
GωH0 denote the transformed game form, which has no administrator moves and OSPS-
implements the deterministic rule fωH0 given by:
fωH0 (θ) = xG(h∅, (Si(θi))i∈N , B0(ωH0)).
Define G+ ∈ Γ such that (i) at the initial history, the administrator selects from ΩH0 ,
(ii) each initial action ωH0 is followed by the game form G
ωH0 , which has no administrator
moves, and (iii) the administrator’s strategy B+0 is the identity. For each i ∈ N , each
θi ∈ Θi and each of i’s histories hωH0 , define S+i (θi)(hωH0 ) ≡ SωH0i (θi)(hωH0 ). Clearly, for
each θ ∈ Θ, (S+i (θi)) ∈ OSPS(G+, θ), since at each information set, each agent compares
the same possibilities that he did at one of the game forms GωH0 .
Consider (G+,A, µ) ∈ ΓMP . By construction, for each θ ∈ Θ and each X ′ ∈ X , the
administrator states that lead to X ′-outcomes in G+ are precisely those that label actions
whose ensuing game forms lead to X ′-outcomes in G+, which are precisely those that lead
to X ′-outcomes in G:
{ωH0 ∈ ΩH0|xG
+
(h+∅ , (S
+
i (θi))i∈N , B
+
0 (ωH0)) ∈ X ′}
= {ωH0 ∈ ΩH0 |xGωH0 (hωH0∅ , (S
ωH0
i (θi))i∈N) ∈ X ′}
= {ωH0 ∈ ΩH0|xG(h∅, (Si(θi))i∈N , B0(ωH0)) ∈ X ′}.
Because µ assigns the same number to the former in (G+,A, µ) as to the latter in (G,A, µ),
thus
µ
({ωH0 ∈ ΩH0|xG+(h+∅ , (S+i (θi))i∈N , B+0 (ωH0)) ∈ X ′}) = f(θ)(X ′),
so (G+,A, µ) random OSPS-implements f .
It remains to transform (G+,A, µ) into a randomized round table mechanism (G∗,A, µ)
while preserving random OSPS-implementation of f . To do so, simply use Proposition 2
to replace each game form GωH0 with a round table mechanism that OSPS-implements
the same deterministic rule fωH0 , and let (S∗i )i∈N gather the associated strategies. By
construction,
{ωH0 ∈ ΩH0|xG
∗
(h∗∅, (S∗i (θi))i∈N , B∗0(ωH0)) ∈ X ′}
= {ωH0 ∈ ΩH0|xG
+
(h+∅ , (S
+
i (θi))i∈N , B
+
0 (ωH0)) ∈ X ′},
and µ assigns the same number to the former in (G∗,A, µ) as to the latter in (G+,A, µ),
so (G∗,A, µ) random OSPS-implements f , as desired. That (G∗,A, µ) is a randomized
round table mechanism is obvious. 
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Appendix D
In this appendix, we prove Theorem 2:
Theorem 2: Random serial dictatorship has no round table implementation.
Proof: Let f denote random serial dictatorship. Assume, by way of contradiction, that
there is round table mechanism G that OSPS-implements f .
Let us say that a history is nondegenerate if it has more than one action.13 As G
OSPS-implements f , there must be a sharp history h. As the game tree is a tree, the
predecessors of h are well-ordered, and thus h has an earliest sharp predecessor h∗. As G
is a round table mechanism, h∗ is controlled by some agent i ∈ N and the actions at h∗
are labeled by sets of types; as h∗ has no sharp predecessors, these actions partition Θi.
Define θ∗i by:
θ∗i (a) ≡

9, a = A,
6, a = B,
0, a = C.
Let Θ∗ be the action at h∗ that includes θ∗i , and let Θ
′ be a distinct action at h∗.
Let us evaluate Si(θ∗i ) at h∗, supposing that i has type θ∗i . As h∗ has no sharp
predecessors and G OSPS-implements f , thus the worst-case scenario from continuing
with Si(θ∗i ) is an outcome where i receives a uniform lottery over the three objects.
Thus Θ′ cannot include a type where A is top-ranked, else by similar logic the best-case
scenario from deviating to Θ′ would be an outcome where i receives A with probability 1,
contradicting that Si(θ∗i ) is obviously dominant for type θ∗i . Moreover, Θ′ cannot include
a type where B is top-ranked, else by deviating it would be possible for i to receive B
with probability 1, contradicting that Si(θ∗i ) is obviously dominant for type θ∗i . As Θ′ was
arbitrary, thus all actions at h∗ except for Θ∗ only include types where C is top-ranked.
Define θ∗∗i by:
θ∗∗i (a) ≡

9, a = A,
6, a = C,
0, a = B.
Let us evaluate Si(θ∗∗i ) at h∗, supposing that i has type θ∗∗i . Since θ∗∗i does not top-rank
C, thus θ∗∗i ∈ Θ∗. Using the logic from the previous paragraph, the worst-case scenario
from continuing with Si(θ∗∗i ) is an outcome where i receives a uniform lottery over the
three objects, and by deviating to Θ′ (where necessarily all types top-rank C) it would be
possible for i to receive C with probability 1. But then Si(θ∗∗i ) is not obviously dominant
for type θ∗∗i , contradicting that G OSP
S-implements f . 
Appendix E
In this appendix, we prove Theorem 3.
We begin with two similar observations. First, if a deterministic rule has an OSPM-
implementation, then it has one in pure strategies:
13Bade and Gonczarowski (2017) observe that attention can be restricted to game trees for which all
histories are nondegenerate.
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Lemma 3.1: If G ∈ Γ OSPM-implements f through M, then for each ωN ∈ ΩN ,
G OSPS-implements f through S, where for each i ∈ N and each θi ∈ Θi, Si(θi) =
Mi(θi)(ωi).
Proof: Suppose G OSPM-implements f through M, and let ωN ∈ ΩN . For each i ∈ N
and each θi ∈ Θi, define Si(θi) ≡M(θi)(ωi).
Let θ ∈ Θ and let i ∈ N . Define Mi ≡ Mi(θi) and define Si ≡ Si(θi). We claim Si is
obviously S-dominant. Indeed, let Ii ∈ Ii(Si). Since Si = Mi(ωi), thus Ii ∈ Ii(Mi(ωi)).
Since Mi is obviously dominant, for each pair h, h
′ ∈ Ii, each M ′i ∈ Mi such that
Mi(ωi)(Ii) 6= M ′i(ωi)(Ii), each pair M−i,M ′−i ∈ M−i, each pair ω−i, ω′−i ∈ Ω−i, and each
pair ωH0 , ω
′
H0
∈ ΩH0 ,
xG(h,Mi(ωi), (Mj(ωj))j∈N\{i}, B0(ωH0))
Ri
xG(h′,M ′i(ωi), (M
′
j(ω
′
j))j∈N\{i}, B0(ω
′
H0
)).
Moreover, Si = Mi(ωi), and each pure strategy is a realization of some mixed strategy.
Thus for each pair h, h′ ∈ Ii, each S ′i ∈ Si such that Si(Ii) 6= S ′i(Ii), each pair S−i, S ′−i ∈
S−i, and each pair ωH0 , ω′H0 ∈ ΩH0 ,
xG(h, Si, S−i, B0(ωH0))
Ri
xG(h′, S ′i, S
′
−i, B0(ω
′
H0
)),
so Si is obviously dominant. Since i ∈ N was arbitrary, thus (Si(θi)) ∈ OSPS(G, θ).
Since θ ∈ Θ was arbitrary, thus G OSPS-implements f through S. Since (ωi) ∈ ×Ωi was
arbitrary, we are done. 
Second, if a deterministic rule has an OSPB-implementation, then it has one in pure
strategies:
Lemma 3.2: If G ∈ Γ OSPB-implements f through B, then for each ωHN ∈ ΩHN such
that for each pair h and h′ that share an information set, ωh = ωh′ , G OSPS-implements
f through S, where for each i ∈ N and each θi ∈ Θi, Si(θi) = Bi(θi)(ωHi).
Proof: Suppose G OSPB-implements f through B, and let ωHN ∈ ×ΩHN such that for
each pair h and h′ that share an information set, ωh = ωh′ . For each i ∈ N and each
θi ∈ Θi, define Si(θi) ≡ B(θi)(ωHi).
First, we claim that S is a Harsanyi pure strategy profile. Indeed, let i ∈ N , let θi ∈ Θi,
let Ii ∈ Ii, and let h, h′ ∈ Ii. Since Bi(θi) is a behavioral strategy, it includes the same
mapping at h and h′; since by hypothesis ωh = ωh′ , thus Bi(θi)(ωHi)(hi) = Bi(θi)(ωHi)(h′i).
Since Ii ∈ Ii and h, h′ ∈ Ii were arbitrary, thus the choice function Bi(θi)(ωHi) is a pure
strategy. Since θi ∈ Θi was arbitrary, thus Si is a Harsanyi pure strategy. Since i ∈ N
was arbitrary, thus S is a Harsanyi pure strategy profile, as desired.
Let θ ∈ Θ and let i ∈ N . Define Bi ≡ Bi(θi) and define Si ≡ Si(θi). We claim Si is
obviously S-dominant. Indeed, let Ii ∈ Ii(Si). By construction, Ii(Si) ⊆ Ii(Bi), so Ii ∈
Ii(Bi). Since Bi is obviously dominant, for each pair h, h′ ∈ Ii, each ωx ∈ Ωh = Ωh′ , each
B′i ∈ Bi such that Bi(ωx) 6= B′i(ωx), each ωHi\{h} ∈ ΩHi\{h}, each ω′Hi\{h} ∈ ΩHi\{h}, each
pair B−i, B′−i ∈ B−i, each pair (ω∗Hj)j∈N\{i}, (ω′Hj) ∈ ×N\{i}ΩHj , and each pair ωH0 , ω′H0 ∈
ΩH0 ,
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xG(h,Bi(ωx, ω
∗
Hi\{h}), (Bj(ωHj))j∈N\{i}, B0(ωH0))
Ri
xG(h′, B′i(ωx, ω
′
Hi\{h′}), (B
′
j(ω
′
Hj
))j∈N\{i}, B0(ω′H0)).
In particular, this holds for (ωx, ω
∗
Hi\{h}) = ωHi . Moreover, each pure strategy is a
realization of some behavioral strategy. Thus for each pair h, h′ ∈ Ii, each S ′i ∈ Si
such that Si(Ii) 6= S ′i(Ii), each pair S−i, S ′−i ∈ S−i, and each pair ωH0 , ω′H0 ∈ ΩH0 ,
xG(h, Si, S−i, B0(ωH0))
Ri
xG(h′, S ′i, S
′
−i, B0(ω
′
H0
)),
so Si is obviously dominant. Since i ∈ N was arbitrary, thus (Si(θi)) ∈ OSPS(G, θ).
Since θ ∈ Θ was arbitrary, thus G OSPS-implements f through S. Since (ωHN ) ∈ ×ΩHN
satisfying the given restriction was arbitrary, we are done. 
By Lemma 3.1, Lemma 3.2, and Proposition 2, if a rule has any kind of obviously
strategy-proof implementation, then it has a round table implementation. Altogether,
we have established:
Theorem 3: If a deterministic rule f is either
(i) OSPS-implementable,
(ii) OSPM-implementable, or
(iii) OSPB-implementable,
then it has a round table implementation, which is an OSPC-implementation.
Appendix F
In this appendix, we prove Theorem 4:
Theorem 4: Suppose there is a finite set of outcomes and each agent has a von Neumann-
Morgenstern type compatible with a strict ranking over outcomes. If a stochastic rule
f has a random OSPS-implementation, then f is ordinal and has a randomized ordinal
round table implementation.
Proof: Suppose f has a random OSPS-implementation. Then by Theorem 1, it has a
random round table implementation.
Let i ∈ N , and let θi, θ′i ∈ Θi be a pair of von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions
that are compatible with the same ordinal preferences over outcomes. Let Hθi,θ′i be the
collection of histories where i has one action that includes θi and another action that
includes θ′i. At each h ∈ Hθi,θ′i , let Xhθi be the collection of outcomes that could occur
when the strategy of reporting θi is followed from h, and let X
h
θ′i
be the collection of
outcomes that could occur when the strategy of reporting θ′i is followed from h. As
truthful reporting of θi and truthful reporting of θ
′
i are both obviously dominant for i,
and as both of these types share a strict ranking of outcomes, it follows that Xhθi and X
h
θ′i
are the same singleton.
Let θ−i ∈ Θ−i. By the above observation, the distribution over outcomes generated
by administrator randomization for reports of (θi, θ−i) is the same as the distribution
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generated for (θ′i, θ−i). As we have a random round table implementation of f , thus
f(θi, θ−i) = f(θ′i, θ−i); it follows that f is ordinal.
Let [θi] ⊆ Θi be the collection of types for i that are compatible with the same ranking
of outcomes as θi. For each action that includes θi, relabel the action to be the union
of its previous types with the types in [θi]. For each action that does not include θi,
relabel the action to be its previous types except for those in [θi]. Finally, prune off
all histories that follow from an action whose label is now empty. For each θ∗i ∈ Θi
and each θ−i ∈ Θ−i, the reports (θ∗i , θ−i) determine the same outcome for each round
table mechanism selected by the administrator before and after this operation; thus the
distribution generated by administrator randomization for reports (θ∗i , θ−i) is the same
before and after this operation, so we have a new round table implementation of f .
This relabeling and pruning can be done for each of the finitely many rankings for i,
and then all of these stages of relabeling and pruning can be done for each of the finitely
many agents. Finally, relabel each action by its associated rankings of its types; the result
is clearly a random ordinal round table implementation of f . 
Appendix G
In this appendix, we prove Theorem 5:
Theorem 5: A deterministic rule f has an OSPC-implementation if and only if it has
a SP-implementation through a round table mechanism.
Proof: We prove the two implications in sequence. Note that because for each round
table mechanism G ∈ ΓRT , the administrator does not play (H0 = ∅), we will suppress
notation involving him.
[⇒] Assume f has an OSPC-implementation. By Proposition 2, there are G ∈ ΓRT and
an associated Harsanyi pure strategy profile S such that G OSPC-implements f through
S. For each θ ∈ Θ, since
• by definition, (Si(θi)) ∈ OSPC(G, θ);
• because G ∈ ΓRT , OSPC(G, θ) = OSPS(G, θ); and
• by definition, OSPS(G, θ) ⊆ SP(G, θ);
thus altogether (Si(θi)) ∈ SP(G, θ). Since for each θ ∈ Θ, xG(h∅, (Si(θi))i∈N) = f(θ),
thus G SP-implements f through S, as desired.
[⇐] Assume there are G ∈ ΓRT and an associated Harsanyi pure strategy profile S such
that G SP-implements f through S. We claim that G OSPC-implements f through S.
Indeed, let θ ∈ Θ, let i ∈ N , and define Si ≡ Si(θi).
We claim Si is obviously dominant. Indeed, let Ii ∈ Ii(Si), let h, h′ ∈ Ii, let C ′i ∈ Ci
such that Si(Ii) 6= C ′i(Ii), and let C−i, C ′−i ∈ C−i. (As G ∈ ΓRT , the administrator does
not play; C0 = ∅.)
Since G ∈ ΓRT , h = h′. Define h1 to be the unique next history after h determined
by the action Si(h), and define h2 to be the unique next history after h determined by
the action C ′i(h). Partition H−i into H0, H1, H2, and H∗, where:
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• H0 ≡ {h′ ∈ H−i|h′ ≺ h},
• H1 ≡ {h′ ∈ H−i|h1 - h′},
• H2 ≡ {h′ ∈ H−i|h2 - h′}, and
• H∗ ≡ H−i\(H1 ∪H2).
We use these to define S−i ∈ S−i. Since G ∈ ΓRT , we can do so history-by-history:
• for each h′ ∈ H0, define j ≡ P (h′), and define Sj(h′) to be the action that determines
the unique next history in the (well-ordered) chain {h′′ ∈ H|h′′ - h};
• for each h′ ∈ H1, define j ≡ P (h′), and define Sj(h′) ≡ Cj(h′);
• for each h′ ∈ H2, define j ≡ P (h′), and define Sj(h′) ≡ C ′j(h′); and
• for each h′ ∈ H∗, define j ≡ P (h′), and let Sj(h′) ∈ A(h′) be arbitrary.
Define S ′i ∈ Si such that
• for each h′ ∈ Hi such that h′ ≺ h, S ′i(h′) = Si(h);
• for each h′ ∈ Hi such that h - h′, S ′i(h′) = C ′i(h′); and
• for all other h′, S ′i(h′) ∈ A(h′) is arbitrary.
Since Si is dominant, we have
xG(h∅, Si, S−i)
Ri
xG(h∅, S ′i, S−i).
Since {h} = Ii ∈ Ii(Si), by construction of S−i, h ∈ piG(h∅, Si, S−i). Since Si and S ′i agree
on histories that precede h, thus h ∈ piG(h∅, S ′i, S−i). Therefore, by construction of S−i,
(i) xG(h∅, Si, S−i) = xG(h, Si, C−i), and
(ii) xG(h∅, S ′i, S−i) = x
G(h′, C ′i, C
′
−i),
so Si is obviously C-dominant. Since i ∈ N was arbitrary, (Si(θi)) ∈ OSPC(G, θ). Since
θ ∈ Θ was arbitrary, thus for each θ ∈ Θ, (Si(θi)) ∈ OSPC(G, θ). Since for each θ ∈ Θ,
xG(h∅, (Si(θi))) = f(θ), thus G OSPC-implements f through S, as desired. 
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